The paper illustrates how one may assess our comprehensive uncertainty about the various relations in the entire chain from human activity to climate change. Using a modified version of the RICE model of the global economy and climate, we perform Monte Carlo simulations, where full sets of parameters in the model's most important equations are drawn randomly from pre-specified distributions, and present results in the forms of fan charts and histograms. Our results suggest that under a Business-As-Usual scenario, the median increase of global mean temperature in 2105 relative to 1900 will be around 3.7
Introduction
Uncertainty about future climate change is an unavoidable fact. It is commonplace to gauge this uncertainty by simulations with different climate models. This is the approach taken, e.g., by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001 (IPCC, , 2007 to highlight our imprecise knowledge about the relation between specific atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and global temperature. These model simulations typically rely on a small set of common and deterministic emission scenarios, so-called SRES-storylines (Nakićenović et al., 2000) , which are not related to the processes underlying economic growth and energy use in an explicit and reproducible way. The approach is thus a partial one, focusing on specific biogeophysical relations in the complicated chain from human activity to climate change (and back). However, the socioeconomic relations behind regional and global economic growth, energy use and emissions are equally fraught with uncertainty as the biogeophysical relations.
A comprehensive assessment of the uncertainties about the important links in the chain from economic conditions to climate change is obviously a monumental task, and this paper is merely a first pass at the problem. Our approach is to simultaneously introduce uncertainty about a number of parameters that shape exogenous variables and endogenous relationships in the same simple, but comprehensive, model of the global climate and economy. We then perform Monte Carlo simulations, i.e., we make a large number of random draws of the full set of parameters and simulate the entire model for each such draw to derive probability distributions at different points in time for the variables of most interest.
Conceptually, our analysis is similar to that of Wigley and Raper (2001) who derive a probability distribution for future global mean temperature in a simple climate model, by introducing uncertainty through assigned probability density functions (p.d.f.) for the main drivers of temperature. However, their study stresses uncertainties in the biogeophysical and biogeochemical systems, while emissions are given by a (uniform) p.d.f. over alternative SRES scenarios, rather than alternative socioeconomic developments. A similar analysis is performed in the PAGE model (Hope, 2006) used in the Stern Review (Stern, 2007) . Analogously, Murphy et al. (2004) derive a probability distribution for climate sensitivity (the effect on global mean temperature of doubled greenhouse gas concentration) from the Hadley Centre climate model, by drawing alternative values of the parameters that govern the model's important relations. While these studies focus on the physical and chemical systems, Nordhaus and Popp (1997) do consider uncertainty about socioeconomic drivers of climate change, but their purpose is different (to gauge the value of different types of scientific information).
Our analysis relies on a slightly modified version of RICE, an integrated model of climate and growth, developed and described by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) . Section 2 gives a short description of that model and our modifications of it. Section 3 explains how we introduce uncertainty about model parameters. Section 4 presents results for variables of interest in two forms: fan charts, which illustrate how uncertainty develops over time, and histograms, which illustrate uncertainty at a point in time 100 years from now. Section 5 concludes.
The modified RICE model
We need a model that incorporates the global economy as well as the climate system and allows us to parametrically vary assumptions about important relations. For these reasons, we use an adapted version of the RICE-99 model, as formulated in Appendix D of Nordhaus and Boyer. (2000) 1 Next, we provide an overview of this model and our modifications. Equation numbers, variables, and parameters in brackets refer to a formal description of the model in the Appendix.
General description of RICE-99. The world is divided into eight regions (indexed by J) on the basis of geography as well as levels of economic development: United States (USA), OECD Europe (EUR), Other High Income countries (OHI), Russia and Eastern Europe (REE), Middle Income (MI), Lower Middle Income (LMI), China (CHI) and Lower Income (LI). 2 Neither trade nor investments flow between regions. Time (indexed by t) is measured in 10-year periods, starting in 1995. In each period, each region produces a homogeneous good with a neoclassical production technology based on capital and labor, but augmented by "energy services" reflecting the carbon content of energy inputs (see equation A.4). Regional damages from climate change are modelled as an output loss proportional to the value of GDP.
Economic growth in each region is driven by growth of population (A.5) and total factor productivity (TFP) (A.6). Higher economic growth implies more rapidly increasing regional demand for energy. How much this translates into use of exhaustible carbon resources depends on carbon-saving technological change (A.7), as well as regional energy prices. These prices have a regional component, reflecting regional taxes and distribution costs, and a global component, reflecting gradual exhaustion of the finite global supplies of oil, coal and natural gas (A.10-A.12). Naturally, higher prices curtail energy use.
Energy use in each region and time period creates industrial CO 2 emissions that, together with emissions from changes in land use and changes in the properties of the biosphere, end up in the global atmosphere (A.13). The model incorporates a simple carbon cycle, i.e., carbon flows between atmosphere, biosphere (cum shallow oceans), and deep oceans (A.14). Any CO 2 not absorbed in the ocean sinks adds to atmospheric concentration. Via increased radiation (A.15) more CO 2 raises global-mean surface temperature (A.16) in an amount depending on climate sensitivity. 3 Changes in climate create damages reflecting e.g., lower agricultural productivity, more frequent storms, or resettlements due to coastal flooding (A.17 and A.18). Damages, as a proportion of gross GDP, are region-specific quadratic functions of global temperatures in the period relative to 1900. Larger damages imply lower welfare. They also create a negative feedback effect, whereby lower output growth leads to less energy use ultimately reducing temperature.
Along an equilibrium time path of the model, consumers and producers in each region make decentralized utility and profit-maximizing decisions, adjusting savings and investments to the incomes, interest rates, technologies, and market prices they observe and rationally expect to prevail in the future. In particular, producers adjust their use of carbon-based energy to available technologies and regional energy prices. Regional and global welfare functions (A.1-A.3) are maximized in equilibrium.
RICE can be programmed and solved in two ways. The usual way is to maximize welfare, taking regional damages explicitly into account, so as to derive optimal uses of carbon-based energy, given their adverse effects via global temperature, and to calculate optimal carbon prices. Since our purpose is different, we do not take damages into account in the maximization. This way, we illustrate future paths in the absence of additional mitigation measures: Business As Usual (BAU) in the jargon of the climate-change literature.
Modifications We make a few adjustments to the RICE model, as follows. RICE assumes that the rate (all) consumers use to discount the utility of future consumption declines over time; we reset it to a constant. Specific assumptions about the discount rate are very important when using a climate model for the normative (prescriptive) purpose of finding optimal paths of mitigation (because abatement costs close in time are traded off against benefits of lower damages much further away in time). 5 For our specific positive (descriptive) purpose to illustrate uncertainty about future outcomes under BAU assumptions, the discount rate is much less important.
Finally, we try to incorporate scientific findings that the biosphere's ability to absorb CO 2 might change with climate. 6 At some level of CO 2 concentration in the atmosphere, the biosphere will likely switch from being a CO 2 sink to a CO 2 source. (Oceans too may absorb less CO 2 as climate changes, but these effects are smaller and less certain.) It is estimated that this terrestrial biosphere effect may contribute an additional 40-400 Gigatons of carbon (GtC) into the atmosphere by 2105, most models predicting a number between 100 and 200 GtC.
Ideally, the terrestrial biosphere effect should be added as an additional module to the climate part of the model. We have chosen a simpler solution: we just add an additional flow of emissions into the atmosphere in every period, calibrated to yield an average additional concentration in 2105 corresponding to 150 GtC. However, this value is highly uncertain, so we impose a probability distribution on it, as we do for many other model parameters. 7 The specification of such parameter uncertainties is the topic of the next section. 5 The specific assumptions about the discount rate have indeed been one of the major points in the public discussion about the conclusions in the Stern Review (Stern (ed), 2006); see, e.g., Nordhaus (2006) , Dasgupta (2007) and Weitzman (2007) . 6 This alteration of the model is based on personal communications with Will Steffen and on Friedlingstein et al. (2006) . 7 Specifically, these additional emissions are modelled with the following process:
where scalars τ1, τ2 and τ3 and random variable γ have been calibrated so that the terrestrial biosphere effect, on everage, adds 150 GtC in the atmosphere by 2105, with values falling between 40 and 400 GtC.
Introducing Uncertainty
We express the uncertainty about individual parameters and exogenous variables in the model as statistical distributions on the forms summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 4. Most distributions are assumed to be standard normals, but when they are deemed asymmetric we use beta distributions. The probability distribution for the climate sensitivity parameter is a special case derived from a truncated normal distribution, as discussed below. Means for most parameters are close to the specific parameter values used in RICE, except that we raise the means of initial TFP growth rates to correspond more closely to the growth experience in the last ten years.
Using the p.d.f. of each one of the assumed distributions, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation with 1001 independent random draws of the full set of parameters. For each of these draws, we carry out a full dynamic simulation for 400 years: an equilibrium time path of the model, as described above. These 1001 equilibrium paths generate different levels of GDP, emissions, temperatures, etc., which we use to describe the uncertainty about these outcomes.
Of course, each assumption regarding the distribution of an underlying parameter is a subjective assessment, made by ourselves or some collective of scientists. Most of the many relations that contribute to the climate problem are highly uncertain, however, and our objective is to illustrate a way to take this comprehensive uncertainty into account. We believe that the exercise meaningfully gauges the magnitude of uncertainty at different time horizons. Moreover, it helps illustrate the effects of favorable or unfavorable -from the viewpoint of climate change -circumstances, and which circumstances matter the most. Next, we provide details on the various sources of uncertainty.
Population Population growth is a major source of uncertainty about future output growth. In RICE, regional population trajectories are pinned down by two parameters: initial population growth rates, and the decline rates for population growth (g L J (0), and δ L J in A.5). To calibrate these parameters, we rely on the UN World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database, which contains forecasts for all countries in the world in five-year intervals up until 2050 in the form of three different scenarios: low, median and high. We aggregate these country scenarios up to RICE regions.
For five RICE regions (USA, REE, MI, LMI and LI), the UN forecasts and their implied uncertainty can be approximated very closely with model parameters. Mean values for initial population growth rates, g L J (0), are set at the growth rate in the UN median scenario between 2000 and 2010, and mean values for decline in population growth, δ L J , are fitted using the 2005 and 2045 values for this scenario. We calibrate a p.d.f. for each regional population by taking the low and high scenarios to correspond to ±2 standard deviations, and use the value
as an estimate for the standard deviation. Similarly, the population growth decline parameters are fitted to the low and high scenarios, and
] used as standard deviations. 8 Resulting means and standard deviations are reported in Table 4 in the Appendix.
In the remaining three regions (EUR, OHI, CHI), population levels are projected to first rise and then fall, which does not square with the parametrization in RICE. Mean population forecasts and the uncertainty around them are therefore entered manually up until 2045. 9 The mean and uncertainty about the post-2045 population growth rates are then parametrized by the same method as the one used from 2005 for the other five regions. Values for the post-2045 parameters are reported in Table 4 in the Appendix. Figure 1 shows the median population trajectories for all regions and confidence bands around them in the form of fan charts. 10 TFP Along with population growth, productivity growth is the most important determinant of future output levels. As mentioned above, we use higher initial TFP growth rates than RICE-99, namely the figures reported in Table 1 , which we estimated based on the Penn World Tables data set. Decline parameters for TFP growth, δ A J , are scaled up by the same amount as the corresponding growth rates, g A J (0). 11 For five regions (US, EUR, OHI, CHI, LI), we judge that the distribution of initial TFP growth rates, g A J (0), is skewed to the right. To achieve this, we use Beta distributions with parameters chosen to match our hypothesized 8 An exception is Russia and Eastern Europe, where variability in δ L J needed to be reduced, or the population of REE would approach zero within the time frame of the program. Even though this region has a negative population growth rate, we do not expect its population to disappear entirely. The variability for the US also had to be reduced slightly, in order to avoid numerical problems with the most extreme draws. 9 Specifically, quadratic functions of the form LJ (t) = aJ + bJ t + cJ t The regional TFP growth processes are modelled as independent of each other -i.e., in a particular model simulation, say, the US, may have rapid TFP growth while Europe's is slow. If technology spreads easily across Energy efficiency Energy efficiency in prodcution, ζ J (t), is modelled as the reciprocal of Z J (t), which represents the ratio of CO 2 emissions to output (also referred to as carbon intensity). Z is set at 1 in all regions in the initial period and then declines following a process similar to population and TFP growth, with an initial (negative) growth rate, g Z J (0), and a decline parameter, δ Z J . A lower value of Z means higher energy efficiency ζ: less CO 2 is emitted for the same amount of carbon energy used. Exploiting data on 12 The Beta distributions of the underlying variables are clearly visible in the figure. Notice that also the regions where g the ratio of CO 2 emissions to GDP, carbon intensity, from the World Bank World Development Indicators database, we estimate initial-period growth rates using data for the period 1997-2003. Specifically, we estimate mean yearly carbon intensity growth rates over this time period, and aggregate up to RICE regions and ten-year growth rates. In order to reduce the impact on carbon intensity of processes that are not proper improvements in energy efficiency (as defined in the model), we use an average between these estimates and the original RICE figures.
Looking at realized ratios of CO 2 emissions to GDP over time (i.e., from 1975 to 2003, the period where data exist), efficiency improvements indeed appear highly uncertain. Some countries seem to follow roughly a RICE type of process, in others CO 2 /GDP ratios jump up and down almost randomly, while a few actually experience higher carbon intensity. 13 Of course, observed carbon intensities stem from various sources, including e.g., changes in product mix and development of alternative energy sources. In the end, we settled for a standard deviation of 30% of the mean value. This makes initial growth rates, g Z J (0), relatively variable, but always contained in the range [0, 2µ], where µ denotes the mean value. Improvement decline parameters, δ Z J , are scaled up proportionally and given standard deviations of 20% of their means. Figure 3 shows the forecasts for the energy efficiency parameter ζ J (t).
Land use Emissions of CO 2 due to changes in land use arise mainly from deforestation: carbon of burnt biomass is released as carbon dioxide. In RICE, this process is modeled in similar fashion to other growth processes. Each region has an initial rate of emissions due to land use changes, and these rates then decline slowly at a rate set at 10% per decade. We update initial emission rates and introduce uncertainty over them, based on figures in Chapter 7 of the WG1 contribution to the fourth IPCC Assessment Report (IPCC 2007) . In particular, we use the disaggregated (Tropical Americas, Africa and Asia) AR4 estimates for the 1990s given in Table 7 .2, interpreting the uncertainty ranges as ±3 standard deviations. 14 The figures for the Lower Middle Income and especially Lower Income regions are revised upwards; for the other regions, changes are minor. Exact figures are reported in Table 4 in the Appendix. Climate sensitivity The climate sensitivity parameter, κ, measures the rise in temperature following a doubling of atmospheric CO 2 concentrations. Many estimates of this parameter lie in the region around 3.0, but uncertainty about the true value is substantial and many climate models generate an asymmetric distribution. As explained by Roe and Baker (2007), a distribution with a pronounced right tail is a natural outcome of uncertainty about the various feedback processes whereby higher temperatures raise the level of radiative forcing. Examples of such feedbacks are changes in the formation of water vapor and clouds, or in the earth's albedo (ability to reflect solar radiation). In the RICE model framework, it is natural to portray the uncertainty about such fedbacks as uncertainty about climate sensitivity. We generate the latter following the same reduced-form approach as Roe and Baker. In their notation, we set (the average value and standard deviation of the feedback parameter) f = 0.65 and σ = 0.10, and in order to avoid extremely high (even infinite) values for κ, we truncate the distribution by cutting off 1% in the upper tail. Passing this truncated normal through the highly nonlinear transformation illustrated in Roe and Bakers's Figure 1 , we obtain a p.d.f. similar in shape to the weighted p.d.f. reported in Figure  3 of Murphy et al. (2004) . 15 The mean and median of this theoretical distribution are about 3.72 and 3.42 respectively. Figure 4 plots the frequency of draws, the realized p.d.f. for κ, used in our simulations. Other uncertainties As mentioned above, we use a constant rate of time preference (ρ). The discount rate is assumed to have a normal distribution with standard deviation 0.33 around an average value of 3% (the initial rate in RICE). This way, random draws almost always fall within the range [2, 4] with most outcomes within [2.5, 3.5].
The regional coefficient on carbon-energy in the production function (β J ), the damage function parameters (θ 1,J and θ 2,J ), as well as the global carbon supply parameters (ξ 2 , ξ 3 and CMAX ) are assigned normal distributions with standard deviations 20% of their mean values.
Results
This section reports on selected results from our Monte Carlo simulations. To keep the presentation short, we focus here on the global variables of most interest.
World GDP Figure 5 shows future values of (the logarithm of) world GDP, measured in trillion USD (in 1990 prices).
The left panel illustrates the uncertainty with a fan chart, showing the median realization plus 90 and 99% confidence bands over the coming 150 years. The right panel shows a histogram of estimated world GDP 100 years ahead, which corresponds to an (unsmoothed) p.d.f. for that variable. Most of the uncertainty about future GDP levels stems from variability in 16 But variability in population growth and other exogenous parameters matters too, as does the fact that we report word GDP net of damages caused by rising global temperatures (as defined in A.17 and A.18).
As illustrated by the histogram and fan chart, the distribution is skewed to the right: i.e., we get relatively more extreme realizations of world GDP at the high end than at the low end. Note that there is actually a force pulling in the opposite direction: damages (to GDP) increasing more than proportionately with temperature, together with the right-skew in the p.d.f. of climate sensitivity, tend to produce a GDP distribution skewed to the left. However, this tendency is quantitatively completely swamped by the right-skew of the underlying TFP levels (recall the discussion in Section 3). Inspection of the simulation data reveals that the realizations in the right tail of the world GDP distribution are due to some combination of high growth rates in the US, China or low-income countries; the US because of its high initial GDP level, and the latter two because of their population size.
Industrial emissions Since production requires carbon energy as an input, higher GDP generally means higher industrial CO 2 emissions. However, substantial gains in energy efficiency allow incomes to grow without corre- sponding growth in emissions. Figure 6 illustrates future carbon emissions, measured in GtC. As the fan chart shows, uncertainty increases steadily over time, reflecting the increasing uncertainty about economic growth and energy efficiency. Annual emissions in the median BAU realization reach their maximum more than a hundred years ahead, at almost three times their current level just below 10 GtC per year. Emissions then start to decline slowly, because carbon-saving technological change and the effect of higher carbon prices eventually outweigh the increased demand from higher world production. The upper part of the fan chart shows that in fifty of our 1001 simulations (i.e., 5%) industrial emissions peak at more than four times their current level. The 2105 histogram clearly illustrates an upward skew in the emissions distribution. An important reason is the strong positive correlation between emissions and GDP levels (correlation about 0.53). The data shows that the extreme realizations in the right tail come about when either China or the group of low-income countries experience large increases in GDP growth but little improvement in energy efficiency. This is intuitive, given the population size of these regions, and their relatively poor initial energy efficiency.
Atmospheric concentration Because emissions, even in the low-growth BAU paths, are far larger than the earth's natural absorption capacity, they keep adding to the atmospheric concentration of CO 2 measured in parts per million (ppm). This is illustrated in Figure 7 . In the model, there is a close link between industrial CO 2 emissions and atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. The two are not perfectly correlated, however, given the uncertain terrestrial biosphere effect and uncertain regional changes in land use. Nevertheless, extreme values for CO 2 concentrations reflect the same causes as high industrial emissions. Since the carbon cycle is a slow process, the atmospheric concentrations adjust to emissions only with a long time lag, so we do not see a slowdown in the growth of CO 2 concentrations following the peak in emissions within the time frame of the fan chart. Figure 8 shows future increases in global mean surface temperatures, relative to the year 1900, measured in Centigrades ( • C). A century from now, the median realization of temperature is around 3 • C above today's temperature, which, in turn, is 0.71 • C above the 1900 level. A median temperature hike of 3 • C over a hundred years is broadly consistent with the median doubling of CO 2 concentration in Figure 7 , and a median climate sensitivity of approximately 3.4 as discussed above. What causes variability of global temperature in our simulations? The climate sensitivity parameter, κ, is the most important source of uncertainty. 18 This reflects the fact that climate sensitivity is the last link (in the RICE model) in the chain from human activity to global warming. In 2105, the 99% confidence interval for temperature is about 3 • C wide. This range of warming for the next century is of the same magnitude as the range reported elsewhere, but derived with very different methods (see e.g., IPCC 2001 IPCC , 2007 .
Global warming
Notice that already the 5 th percentile in Figure 8 lies clearly above 2 • C of warming. Indeed, the histogram in the right panel shows that all of the 1001 temperature realizations lie above the 2 • C line -the upper limit suggested in Article 2 of the UN framework Convention on Climate Change. Even the most optimistic realizations in the leftmost tail the for temperature should thus be a matter of grave concern.
Anyone who pays close attention to the optimistic tail, should seriously consider also the pessimistic tail of the distribution for climate change. As the histogram in Figure 8 shows, the highest temperature realizations by of CO2 would double in that time. On the other hand, the model's temperature hike from 2005 to 2105 also incorporates lagged reactions to higher CO2 concentrations before 2005. This adds an additional boost to 2105 temperature, above the value implied by the addition to CO2 concentration between 2005 and 2105.
18 A regression of temperature increase in 2105 on values of draws on κ gives an adjusted R-square of 0.791. 2105 involve a rise around 6 • C. As is well-known the effects of such temperature changes are very hard to predict, but may include sea levels high enough to threaten major cities as London, Shanghai, or New York, and substantial risks of large-scale shifts in the Earth system, such as collapses of the Gulf Stream or the West Antarctic ice sheet.
What realizations of the future lie behind the most severe instances of global warming? As already mentioned, climate sensitivity above its mean is a very important one. But other reasons are more squarely rooted in the human system. One is lower than expected improvements of energy efficiency in regions with high production and dirty technologies: chiefly the US and China. Another root is higher than expected economic growth in very populous regions, in particular the current low-income countries that host about half of the world population. To put it bluntly, futures in which today's unfortunate manage to permanently break out of poverty (without large improvements in energy-saving technologies) have substantially higher global warming. Ironically enough, resolution of one of today's most pressing global problems aggravates another one. Figure 9 illustrates the interplay between different sources of climate change. The bottom right panel plots the temperature increase a hundred years from now against the randomly drawn value of the climate-sensitivity parameter (κ). A log curve approximates the relationship well, but the variability around this curve stems from variation in other parameters. We use the five highlighted observations, labeled 1 through 5 in all graphs, to discuss how GDP growth and energy efficiency matter for climate change. (Note that the temperature axis has the same scale in all four graphs.) Observation 1 has the highest temperature increase, around 6.5 • C. Climate sensitivity is high, but temperature is still well above the fitted curve in the bottom right plot. This is due to very strong GDP growth in low-income countries (the GDP level in 2105 is at the 98 th percentile among 1001 simulations), and exceptionally low energy efficiency in China (ζ CHI (2105) here takes its second-lowest value out of the 1001 simulations). Observation 2, the most extreme outlier on the upside, also has temperature more than 6 • C above pre-industrial. This is due to high GDP growth in China, and also in the group of low-income countries. In addition, energy efficiency experiences little improvement in both regions. In observation 3, relatively high Chinese GDP growth interacts with one of the lowest improvements in Chinese energy efficiency (1 st percentile). US GDP (not shown) is also well above average. Observation 4 is the most extreme downside outlier, with about 1 • C lower temperature than what climate sensitivity predicts -and over 2 • C less than observation 3 (with rougly the same climate sensitivity). Explanations are to be found in low GDP growth in low-income countries, and in high Chinese energy efficiency (96 th percentile). Finally, observation 5 lies well below the fitted curve despite strong GDP growth in China. This is due to relatively high energy efficiency in the same region, and also to low GDP growth combined with high energy improvements in the US.
Conclusions
On the methodological side, we see the paper as illustrating a way forward in analyzing uncertainty about future climate change, which includes the most important determinants in the human system as well as the natural system. Our results suggest that uncertainties about relations in the economic system can play a major role. More research, with less stylized assumptions and more comprehensive climate-economy models, should follow. On the substantive side, the simulations in this paper rely on BAU assumptions regarding energy taxes and other means of mitigating climate change. Our results show that, even under very favorable circumstances, global warming will be an increasing problem over the coming century.
Our simulations also show that damages 19 due to global warming are likely to strike very unevenly across the world's regions.
The fan charts in Figure 10 illustrate how the distributions of regional damages develop over time in four of the world's eight regions. A hundred years from now, the upper bound of the projected damages in low-damage regions USA and China more or less coincide with the lower bound on damages in high-damage regions Western Europe and Low-income countries. This suggests that conflicting political interests are likely to raise a higher hurdle than lack of scientific knowledge for agreements on global mitigation measures. 0.06 -- * Probability distributions are standard normals unless indicated. * * Distributed as Beta(1.5, 3.5), which gives a mean value of 0.3. * * * See discussion in Section 3 and Figure 4 above. 
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